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PRELIMINARY VERSION. A ﬁrm has investment options that it may
use up immediately, or store for future use. A patent, e.g., is an option to
implement an idea via a product or process innovation. Other investment
options are protected by secrecy. An investment option is a proﬁt opportunity
that requires an investment to implement. Because investment options are
scarce, Tobin’s q is always above unity. When the stock of these options rises,
the value of stock market falls, a result that exactly invalidates the use of the
stock market as a positive indicator of the stock of intangibles. Finally, the
stock market alone ensures that equilibrium is eﬃcient.
1 Introduction
An investment option is a proﬁt opportunity that requires an investment to imple-
ment. It is postponable if it is a patented invention, or if it is speciﬁct oaﬁrm so that
others cannot reduce its value by copying it. A ﬁrm has investment options that it
may use up immediately, or store for future use. A patent, for instance, represents an
investment option that only its holder can implement for a certain number of years.
In a sense, even a trademark represents an option to produce a product that no one
else can produce. Some investment options are protected not by law but by secrecy.
Investment options are a focus of the new Keynesian literature (Shleifer 1986),
the strategic delay literature (Chamley and Gale 1994), and the investment literature
(MacDonald and Siegel 1986, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Abel and Eberly 2005). Several
papers do discuss models of business cycles, e.g., Gale (1996), but do not try to ﬁt
data.
The model relates most closely to Yorukoglu (2000) and Abel and Eberly (2005)
but studies diﬀerent issues. It is a competitive GE model in which investment options,
or “seeds” as I shall call them, are needed for the planting of trees. Seeds are produced
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1by trees that are already planted, which I think of as the result of learning by doing.
The number of trees grows over time and, in the absence of the seed constraint on
investment, the model would be a standard one-sector Ak model with random TFP
shocks. The main results are:
Intangibles and Q.–In the model, investment implements new ideas. Unimple-
mented ideas compete for capital, and when there are many around, their price falls,
and with it so then does the price of claims to the output of existing ideas. In this
sense, the more seeds we have on hand, the larger is the stock of what one would
call intangibles, and the lower the value of our planted trees. This result is directly
opposite to that of Hall (2000), who argued who used the value of stocks as a positive
indicator of the stock of intangibles. Technically, the diﬀerence arises because Hall
assumes variable proportions between tangible and intangible capital in production
and no storage of intangibles, whereas I assume the opposite: Fixed proportions in
production and storage. Measures of intangibles based on patent applications and
trademarks co-move negatively with Tobin’s Q,t h u ss u p p o r t i n gm ym o d e l .
Investment and Q.–Because seeds are scarce, the value of planted trees and thus
Tobin’s Q, is always above unity. The standard model with convex adjustment costs
also has Q above unity, but that model forces a smoothness on investment that the
present model does not. Instead, the model induces an intertemporal substitutability
on investment. Thus, at least when agents have perfect foresight about TFP shocks,
the model generates more volatile investment than the standard convex-adjustment
model, and for roughly the same reason that the Rogerson-Hansen economy has more
volatile employment than does the standard RBC model, at least when there is perfect
foresight about shocks to wages. I expect the result to still hold when TFP shocks
are persistent enough.
Decentralization and empirics.–These results hold in the planner’s optimum which
has two decentralizations. The ﬁrst is a complete-markets decentralization in which
a market for seeds exists. The second decentralization has no seeds market, only a
market for shares of ﬁrms. The outcome for quantities and prices remains the same.
It remains to be seen whether the eﬃciency of the no-seeds decentralization survives
when ﬁrms diﬀer. Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) develop a related one-period
model in which ﬁrms diﬀer in how many seeds they have and in the eventual produc-
tivity of trees that they may get to plant; they ﬁnd that even without a seed market,
takeovers (which are still transactions in the market for ﬁr m so n l y )a c h i e v ee ﬃciency.
The results here are consistent with theirs.
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 describes a complete-markets decentraliza-
tion, section 4 an incomplete-markets one. Section 5 reports simulations, compares
the model to the data, and brieﬂy describes some possible extensions. Several proofs
and two deterministic versions of the model — one in discrete and one in continuous
time — are reported in the Appendix.
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The model is that of a growing economy with two types of capital — trees, k,a n d
seeds, S. A seed represents an option, storable indeﬁnitely, to plant exactly one tree.
Production of output.–Output of fruit is
Y = zk.
If X is the number of trees newly planted, k evolves as
k
0 = k + X.( 1 )
Production of seeds.–Let S denote the stock of seeds. New seeds are produced
by existing trees. Each period a tree gives rise to λ new seeds, i.e., a total of
new seeds = λk (2)
Thus seeds grow via a process like learning by doing that takes up no resources.
The planting of trees.–Planting a tree requires a unit of fruit and as e e d .O n l y
one tree per seed can be planted, after which the seed is used up. Let S be the stock
of seeds and let X be the number of trees planted. Then S evolves as
S
0 = λk + S − X.( 3 )
Since X is subtracted from the stock, a seed can be used to plant exactly one tree.
Thus investment is Leontieﬀ in two inputs, seeds and fruit. Their proportions are
equal, an assumption that we shall drop when we get to the empirics, along with the
assumption that neither k nor S depreciate. Leontieﬀ investment implies that output
too is Leontieﬀ in seeds and fruit. Seeds are storable whereas fruit is not.
Timing.–Investment, X, is chosen after the trees produce zk units of fruit and
after λk new seeds. Since S0 ≥ 0, the constraint on X is
X ≤ λk + S. (4)
Thus investment is Leontieﬀ in two inputs: seeds and fruit. We shall let investment
be reversible: 1
T h ei n c o m ei d e n t i t y .–The cost of planting a tree is, as usual, one unit of fruit.
Letting C be the consumption of fruit, the income identity is
zk = C + X.( 5 )
1Unlike Sargent (1980), we shall not impose the constraint X ≥ 0. T h i sc o n s t r a i n ti sn e v e r
violated in any of the simulations which assume that σ =2 . With a much lower value of σ and/or
with a very persistent and variable zt process, X would at times be negative.
3The shocks.–We assume that the shocks follow the ﬁrst-order Markov process:
Pr(zt+1 ≤ z0 | zt = z)=F (z0,z),a n dt h a tz0 is stochastically increasing in z.












The standard one-sector growth model.–It arises when the inequality in (4) never
binds. The latter occurs when λ is large enough, e.g., if λ exceeds the largest possible
z.I ta l s oo c c u r s ,de facto, when the initial stock of seeds, S0, is so large that (4) does
n o tc o m ei n t op l a yf o rav e r yl o n gt i m e .
2.1 The planner’s problem
The state is (k,S,z), and the decision, x, is constrained by (42). The Bellman eq. is












Lemma 1 A unique solution v to (6) exists, and is is strictly concave in (k,S).
Moreover, X is increasing in S and, if z is i.i.d., in z.
Proof. (i) Existence, uniqueness: Let T denote the operator on the RHS of (6).
The operator is a contraction and maps continuous functions v into continuous and
unbounded functions (Tv). Methods of Alvarez and Stokey (2000) show that....(ii)
Concavity: We shall show that if ˜ v is concave then T˜ v is strictly concave. Let
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The constraint (4) is convex and its boundary is linear in S and k.
Therefore if X1 is feasible and optimal for the state (k1,S 1) and X2 is feasible and
optimal for (k2,S 2),t h e nXα ≡ αX1 +( 1− α)X2 is feasible, though not necessarily
optimal for (αk1 +( 1− α)k2,αS 1 +( 1− α)S2).T h e r e f o r ei f0 <α<1






˜ v(k + Xα,λk+ S − Xα,z
0)dF
>α T ˜ v(k1,S 1)+( 1− α)T˜ v(k2,S 2)
Therefore the operator transforms weakly into strictly concave functions. Therefore,
the operator being a contraction, its unique ﬁxed point v is strictly concave. (iii)
Properties of X: (Here I assume the diﬀerentiability needed. Later, ﬁrst derivatives
of v will be shown to exist independently of the results of this Proposition). The
FOC is





v(k + X,λk + S − X,z
0)dF =0
4We have dropped k and z from the arguments of ξ as they play no role in the argument
to be made. We now argue in 3 steps: (A) If a function of one variable H is twice
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> 0; earlier, under (ii)
we showed that concavity of v in (k,S) implies concavity of v in X holding (k,S)
ﬁxed — i.e., that d2v
dX2 < 0 and (B) Therefore ξX < 0 and ξS > 0. And, when z is i.i.d.,




Reducing the state space.–From (43), s0 = λ+s−x
1+x . The following result allows us
to reduce the state space to just (s,z):
Lemma 2 For σ 6=1 ,v is of the form
v(k,S,z)=w(s,z)k
1−σ,




















subject to (42). Moreover, v and w are of the same sign as 1 − σ.
The proof (not reported) substitutes the desired functional form for v on the RHS of
(6), and veriﬁes that the same functional form emerges on the LHS. The case σ =1
is covered separately below. Similar results are in Alvarez and Stokey (2000).
Corollary 1 A unique solution w to (7) exists that is increasing and concave in s.
Proof. Existence: Since a unique v exists, w(s,z)=v(k,S,z)k−(1−σ) is the
unique solution for w. Increasing:I n( 4 2 ) ,ar i s ei ns relaxes the constraint on x.
Moreover, if one inserts on the RHS of (7) a function w that increases in s,e v i d e n t l y
the property is preserved. Concave:T h ec o n c a v i t yo fv(k,S,z)k−(1−σ) in S for ﬁxed
k implies that w is concave in s.
Corollary 2 The policy x(s,z) is increasing in s and, if z is i.i.d., increasing in z.
Proof. All changes in s ≡ S/k can be interpreted as changes in S for a given k.
By Lemma 2, X is, for all k,i n c r e a s i n gi nS.F o rﬁxed k,ar i s ei nS implies a rise in
sand in x. The claim about z follows at once from Lemma 2.
5Figure 1: Relation to the convex adjustment-cost model
The relation to other models is easily seen graphically. In its left panel, Figure 1
shows the consumption-investment trade-oﬀ in the standard model and the convex-
adjustment-cost model. In its right panel,the Figure shows the constraint imposed
by a particular upper bound on x,n a m e l yλ + s.S i n c es ≥ 0, investment can never
be constrained by any number smaller than λ, and so that’s the tightest constraint
on x that can possibly arise. The position of the constraint will depend on what has
been happening earlier. In particular, an “seed crunch” and with it a high value of
Q will turn out to be more likely following a prolonged boom caused by a succession
of large realizations of z. Such realizations are likely to draw s to its minimum level
of zero, leading the constraint to be at λ.






x if x ≤ λ + s
∞ otherwise
denote the cost of investment, in units of fruit. The marginal adjustment costs,
∂
∂xC (x,s), are drawn in Figure 2. Other microfoundations — time to build — is also
related, but more complicated. If time to build is T periods, then there are, in
principle, T capital stocks, the capital that is productive now, and T − 1 capital
types, indexed by the number of periods’ waiting time until it becomes productive.
In sum there are two diﬀerences between this model and the standard one. First,
t h es h a p eo ft h ef e a s i b l es e ti sd i ﬀerent, as Figure 1 shows. And, second, there is
intertemporal substitution in investment.
Lemma 3 w is strictly increasing in z.
Proof. Since x ≥− 1 and since z0 is stochastically increasing in z,f o ra n y
function w(s,z) increasing in z0, the second term on the RHS of (7) is increasing in
6 
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Figure 2: Marginal adjustment costs
z. Moreover, since C ≥ 0,t h eﬁrst term on the RHS of (7) is strictly increasing in z.









The proof is in Appendix 1; if follows the proof of proposition 2 of Lucas (1978)
but is complicated by the seed constraint.
Note that the term (1 − σ)w is positive for all σ 6=1because for σ>1, w<0.
















=0 if s0 > 0
≤ 0 if s0 =0 . (9)
Proof. By Lemma 2, v is diﬀerentiable w.r.t. k,a n di fw is diﬀerentiable w.r.t.




(vk − vS)dF ≤ 0, (10)





















vk =( z − λ)C
−σ+(1 + λ)β
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=( 1+λ)vS+(1 + z)C
−σ
(11)






vk =( 1− σ)wk
−σ − swsk
−σ and vS = wsk
−σ









But vS = wsk−σ and the above equation then reads































from which (9) follows.
2.1.1 The set on which (4) binds
Consumption is most volatile and investment least volatile when (4) binds. Let
∆ = {(s,z) | x(s,z)=λ + s} be the set of states for which (4) binds. In this region,
X cannot respond to z and therefore C moves one-for-one with zk and, hence, is
more volatile than in the standard model. True, this statement is conditional on s,
but for (s,z) ∈ ∆, s0 =0 ,a n dx0 = x(0,z0).I f(s,z) remain in ∆ for more than one
p e r i o d ,t h e ni np e r i o dt w oa n db e y o n d ,
x(0,z)=λ and c = z − λ.
The further z is from being a random walk (and it seems to depart substantially
from it, see (37)) below, the more these rules depart from what the standard model
would predict. In contrast, when s →∞ , we get the standard model, for then the
probability that (4) will bind in the foreseeable future goes to zero. Because x is
increasing in z, ∆ contains large z values. For (s,z) ∈ ∆, s0 =0so that x0 = x(0,z0).
Let z∗ (s)=i n f {z|(z,s)∈∆} z be the boundary of ∆. Then, as Figure 3 illustrates, we
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Figure 3: The set ∆ when z is i.i.d.
Proposition 1 If z ∼ F (z) is i.i.d., then
z
∗ (s)=
1+( 1+α)(λ + s)
α
, (13)

















¶−σ λ(1 − σ)w0 − (1 + s0)(1+z0)(z0 − x0)
−σ
1+λ + s0 dF
½
=1 if s0 > 0






















z−x if s0 > 0
≥ 1+x
z−x if s0 =0
On the other hand, if x is constrained and held constant at λ + s as z varies, the
RHS is decreasing in z.L a r g e z’s make the inequality strict. We ﬁnd the smallest
one that will allow strict equality at x = λ +( 1+λ)s. Setting it at equality we
have 1+λ + s = α(z − λ − s), i.e., (13). Moreover, for z = z∗ (s) at s0 =0so that
x0 = x(0,z0),a n dw0 = w(0,z0), which yields (14).
9Even when z is i.i.d., it still raises x because a higher z today raises wealth and
causes a rise in desired future consumption.
When z is serially correlated, the boundary of ∆ is no longer linear but ∆ retains






λ(1 − σ)w(0,z0) − (1 + s0)(1+z0)(z0 − x[0,z0])
−σ




While x is less volatile on ∆, to achieve a given growth rate, x must make up for
its low mean on ∆ with a higher mean oﬀ of ∆, which introduces a force towards
bimodality in the distribution of x and a higher volatility of x.
3C o m p l e t e m a r k e t s
Assume that a market for seeds exists. A case can be made that such a market
indeed does indeed exist. Takeovers play a part in achieving transfers of what we call
seeds. A ﬁrm can be said to buy seeds when it acquires a company for its intellectual
property; this is a fairly thick market in which Microsoft and Pﬁzer, e.g., have been
highly active. Firms also buy patent rights from individuals directly and from one
another. A ﬁrm can be said to sell seeds when it spins oﬀ some activity, or when it
hires people at wages that include a negative compensating diﬀerential for the value
that its workers will draws from the experience gained; such a market is modeled, e.g.,
by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). An example of employees walking out with seeds
is Xerox in the 70’s — it had inventions that it was unable or unwilling to implement
and that were later marketed by its former employees.
Let p(s,z) be the price of seeds, and q(s,z) the price of a planted tree without
a claim on its current-period dividends. A ﬁrm pays all its net income in dividends
every period. All trade in seeds is between ﬁrms.
Firms.–A ﬁrm consists of the trees it has planted and of seeds it has stored. The
ﬁrm maximizes its value. That is, it solves
Pk=m a x
X,Y 0 {zk − X +( k + X)q + pS
0}
subject to (3) but not (4); the ﬁrm can support any level of investment X by a seed
purchase, so that S0 can be negative. Of course, (4) will have to hold in the aggregate.
Substituting from (3) for S0,t h eﬁrm’s problem becomes
max
X
{(z + q)k + p(S + λk)+( q − [1 + p])X}
10Arbitrage.–If q diﬀered from 1+p the ﬁrm could drive dividends to plus inﬁnity
by sending X to plus or to minus inﬁnity. A negative X would entail selling oﬀ k
and the seeds that it embodies at a price of 1+p and paying the net proceeds out as
dividends.2 T h e s ee x t r e m eo u t c o m e sc a n n o ta r i s ei ne q u i l i b r i u m ,w em u s th a v et h e
“no-arbitrage condition”3
q =1+p. (15)
which, when substituted into the maximand, means that the ﬁrm’s cum-dividend
value is
P =( z + q)k + p(S + λk). (16)
We shall obtain q from the household’s problem, and then (15) gives us p.
Households.–Let k = # of trees owned by the household. The household’s budget
constraint therefore is
qk
0 + C = zk + qk. (17)
The RHS of (17) gives the household’s dividend receipts which are proportional to
total resources, the LHS describes how they are spent.
The household’s Bellman eq.–The household’s personal state is the pair (k,S),
and it takes (s,z) and their laws of motion as given. Its Bellman equation is
V (k,s,z)=m a x
k0≥0
(












with q(s,z) and s0 (s,z) taken as given.
Since the household gets all the rents, optimality of the equilibrium occurs if and
only if v = V .F o r p to equal its marginal social value in consumption units, we
should have p =
vS
C−σ
Proposition 2 Optimum and equilibrium coincide; for all states,
v = V and p =
vS
C−σ.






kdF =0 . (19)
2The most relevant real-life counterpart of this is when a company sells oﬀ a division, or when it
is acquired.
3This arbitrage condition would hold even if we imposed the constraint that aggregate investment
be nonnegative. An individual ﬁrm could have X<0 without aﬀecting aggregatesOn the other hand,
if the salvage value of k were less than unity, (15) would read
q ≤ 1+p when X ≤ 0.
11If v = V ,( 1 9 )r e a d s−C−σ − vS + β
R
v0























and diﬀerentiating w.r.t. S, (20) follows. This implies that the household’s choice of
k0 should coincide with that of the planner.
Finally, let us show that P, the value of the ﬁrm, equals the marginal social value,
in consumption units, of the capital that it contains.







Proof. The ﬁrst equality in (22): Since we have established that p =
vS
C−σ,w e
need only show that












and therefore we need to show that






















−σ ([1 − σ]w − sws) and vs = wsk
−σ
and the second equality follows.
Calculating q and p.–Optimum and equilibrium are the same, and therefore p









k−σ and vS = 1
kws (s,z)k1−σ.
12Proposition 3 p(s,z) is decreasing in s
Proof. By Corollary 1, w is concave in s which means that ws is decreasing in s.
By Corollary 2, x is increasing in s so that (z − x)
σ is decreasing in s.
Using (8),












−σw − [1 + z]
¶
(23)
Finally, (15) gives us q.4
3.0.2 Measurement of Tobin’s Q
Since s is probably not in the ﬁrm’s book value, by Q or “Tobin’s Q”w es h a l lm e a n








We shall now see that if we include capital gains as part of dividends (which is in any
case needed if dividend policy is to be neutral in its eﬀect on Q), then Q = q.
If the ﬁrm were to hold no seeds into the next period but, instead, sell them and
pay out the proceeds in dividends along with its net earnings, its dividends per unit
of k would equal
ˆ D
k
= z − x(1 + p)+p(s + λ).
In addition to ˆ D, however, the owners of the ﬁrm also enjoy capital gains, the expected
value of which is just the current value of the newly-planted trees, i.e., qX. Therefore






+ qx = z + p(s + λ)
Substituting into (24) yields and using (16) yields
Q = z + q + p(s + λ) − [z − x(1 + p)+p(s + λ)] − qx
= q.
4As a check, the Appendix works out the case case of a large λ or s0 in the decentralization with
seeds. For large values of λ, the seed constraint would either never bind and seeds would not have
any value, and for large s0, the seed constraint would not bind for so many periods into the future
that it would have no practical relevance for policies or prices. Either way, we should have q → 1.
The Appendix veriﬁes that this is indeed so.
134 Incomplete markets
Suppose now that ﬁrms’ shares trade but that seeds do not. In this case, all seeds have
to be stored by the ﬁrms that produced them, and the representative ﬁrm holds both
trees and seeds under its roof, i.e., it is the tree-seed bundle (k,S). The only asset
that a household can own is a claim on the dividends paid by such a ﬁrm. Therefore
this decentralization has just two markets: A market for output, and a market for
ﬁrm’s shares. Since the number of date-t goods (consumption, capital, and seeds) is
three, the number of goods exceeds the number of markets, and we do not expect
recursive competitive equilibrium to be optimal. What follows extends the recursive
equilibrium of Mehra and Prescott (1980) to a growing production economy, as done
in Jovanovic (2006, Sec. 4).
Assume a continuum of ﬁrms of measure one and an equal number of shareholders.
Equilibrium then requires that each shareholder hold exactly one share. Sharehold-
ers have no other income. They take as given ﬁrms’ policies x(s,z).F i r m s p a y
(z − x[s,z])k dividends in state (k,s,z).
The savings decision.–With n shares, a shareholder’s wealth is the current div-
idend, (z − x)k plus the value of his holdings, ˆ Q[s,z]kn. This wealth is spent on con-
sumption and on future holdings of shares ˆ Q(s,z)kn0.T h u sˆ Qkn0+C =
³
[z − x]k + ˆ Qk
´
n,
or after dividing through by k,
ˆ Qn
0 + c =
³




c =( z − x)n + ˆ Q(n − n
0)
where x is given to the shareholder. The shareholder takes the aggregate law of
motion of k0 (s,z) x(s,z) and s0 (s,z) as given. His state is (k,n,s,z),a n d ,w i t h
some of the arguments (s,z) dropped from the notation, his Bellman equation then
is





















Again, V will be homogeneous of degree 1−σ in k,w i t hV (k,n,s,z)=W (n,s,z)k1−σ
and so we eliminate k to get






[z − x(s,z)]n + ˆ Q(s,z)[n − n0]
´1−σ
1 − σ








14Equilibrium requires that n0 (1,s,z)=1 . Evaluated at equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order
condition is
(z − x[s,z])




The consumer faces no constraints on n0 other than the budget constraint. The
envelope theorem can be applied as we shall only ask that the derivative exist at
n0 =1 .T h a td e r i v a t i v ei s
Wn (1,s,z)=( z − x[s,z])
−σ
h
z − x(s,z)+ ˆ Q(s,z)
i
.
When updating this, it must be multiplied by k0/k =1+x.U p o na nu p d a t ea n da
substitution into (26) gives the revised FOC and pricing formula
ˆ Q(s,z)=β (1 + x[s,z])
1−σ
Z


































is the MRS in consumption between today and tomorrow. This is the same as in Lucas
(1978), but adjusted for the growth in the capital stock and, hence, in dividends.
Firm’s choice of x.–Starting in the state (s,z),t h eﬁrm must choose the same
x that all other ﬁrms choose. Let us use bold letters to denote aggregate states and
decisions. The ﬁrm is also concerned with the dividend it pays its current shareholders
and therefore acts so as to maximize its cum-dividend value. That value is ˆ Q(s,z)k+
zk − xk. We put in bold letters the decision rules of other ﬁrms x(s,z) and s0 (s,z)
(they are the same decision, of course). We also must allow for the possibility that
the ﬁrm in question can let its (k,s) evolve diﬀerently from that of other ﬁrms. Now,
k aﬀects ˆ Q only through its eﬀect on U0 (C0)/U0 (C).
Let P denote the cum-dividend price of 1/k’th of the representative ﬁrm, i.e., the
price of the tuple (1,s). Equilibrium is eﬃcient if P = vk + svS,w i t hv deﬁned in
(6). The functional equation (in units of the consumption good) for its cum-dividend
price per unit of k is
P (s,s,z)=m a x
x
µ









We are implicitly assuming that even if a ﬁrm were to choose a value of s diﬀerent
from what other ﬁr m sc h o o s e ,t h em a r k e ti sf u l l ya w a r eo fi t ,a n dp r i c e st h eﬁrm
accordingly. In other words, although markets are incomplete, everyone knows each
ﬁrm’s (k,s,z). In equilibrium,
151. All ﬁrms must choose the same x, and so we ask that in state (s,z)=( s,z),
the ﬁrm will behave like other ﬁrms. That is, at the ﬁxed point for P,t h e
RHS of (29) is maximized by x(s,s,z)=x(s,z). This would imply that
s0 =
λ+s−x(s,s,z)
1+x(s,s,z) = s0 (s,z)=
λ+s−x(s,z)
1+x(s,z) .
2. For all (s,z), the maximized value of the ﬁrm must equal the value that the
shareholders hold:
P (s,s,z)=z − x(s,s,z)+( 1+x(s,s,z)) ˆ Q(s,z). (30)
In fact, property 1 implies property 2 as one can deduce by setting x(s,s,z)=
x(s,z) for all (s,z) so that s0 = s0, in which case substitution from (30) into (29)
makes it identical to (27). Thus it suﬃces to show that property 1 holds. Recall that
U (C)=c1−σ
1−σ so that U0 (C0)/U0 (C)=[ ( 1+x)(z0 − x0)/(z − x)]
−σ. Then, evaluated
at x = x, the FOC in (29), calculated by solving
P (s,s,z)=m a x
s0
½
z − ˆ x(s














λ + s − s0
1+s0 , (32)
and does not depend on the ﬁrm’s action.
Diﬀerentiability of P.–Similar to the proof of Lemma 4 we can establish that
P2 (s,s,z) ≡ ∂
∂sP (s,s,z) exists everywhere. Since
∂ˆ x
∂s0 =











the derivative w.r.t. s0 is 1+x






2dF ≤ 0, with an









=0 if s0 > 0
≤ 0 if s0 =0 , (33)
Eﬃciency.–Here P is the cum-dividend price of one-k’th of the ﬁrm in current
consumption units. Per unit of its k,aﬁrm is a package of (1,s) units of (k,S).
Therefore, eﬃciency would appear to require that P = 1
U0 (vk + svS).I nw h a tf o l l o w s
we let x(s,z) denote the planner’s optimal policy, and s0 (s,z)=
λ+s−x(s,z)
1+x(s,z) .
The next claim states that if the representative ﬁrm used the planner’s policy, its
market value would equal the marginal social value of the bundle (k,S):
Lemma 6
P (s,s,z)=P, (34)
where P is given in (22).
16Proof. Updating (34) by a period we have P (s0 [s,z],s 0,z0)=( 1− σ)(z0 − x[s0,z0])
σ w(s0,z0).
Substituting into the RHS of (29), the latter becomes
















0)dF in view of (28)
=( 1 − σ)(z − x[s,z])
σ w(s,z)
= P (s,s,z), as claimed in (34).
The previous lemma is, however, conditional on the assumption that the repre-
sentative ﬁrm uses the planner’s policy, i.e., that
x(s,s,z)=x(s,z). (35)
N e x tw es h a l ls h o wt h a t( 3 5 )d o e sh o l di f( 3 4 )d o e s .
Lemma 7 If P satisﬁes (34), then (35) holds.
Proof. If (35), then the ﬁrm’s FOC, (33), must coincide with the planner’s FOC,





(P0 − [1 + s0]P0
2)dF.






















−σ = P − (1 + s)P2 (36)


























P − 1 − z
1+λ + s
.




−σ = P − (1 + s)
















ws =( z − x)
−σ P − (1 + z)
1+λ + s
=( z − x)
−σ (1 − σ)(z − x[s,z])







[1 − σ]w − (1 + z)[z − x]
−σ¢
B u tt h i si st h es a m ea s( 8 ) .
Proposition 4 Equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Proof. The RHS of (31) is a contraction operator (NEED PRIMITIVE CON-
DITIONS SO THAT β (1 + x)
R
MdF < 1 − ε for some ε>0). By Lemma 8 its
unique solution, P (s,s,z),s a t i s ﬁe s( 3 4 )a n db yL e m m a9i ta l s os a t i s ﬁes (35), i.e.,
equilibrium decisions are eﬃcient.
4.0.3 The eﬀects of ﬁnancial-market completion
The results say that if all ﬁrms are publicly traded, a stock market exists, the emer-
gence of a seeds market should aﬀect neither prices nor quantities. It is enough that
all ﬁrms trade on the stock market. Even in a ﬁnancially developed society like the
U.S., however, only about one half of the privately owned capital does trade on stock
markets; and therefore further enlargement of the stock market would probably raise
eﬃciency, as Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argued. The model assumes that ﬁrms
have identical z’s, and identical s’s, but ﬁrms can choose to diﬀer from the rest, but
that would lower their market value.
The eﬃciency result should extend to a situation in which ﬁrms do diﬀer because,
e.g., they draw diﬀerent z’s. Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) develop a related
one-period model in which ﬁrms diﬀer in two dimensions: Project quality which we
can interpret as s, and managerial ability, which we can interpret as z.T h e y ﬁnd
that even when s is private information to the ﬁrm being acquired, the stock market
achieves eﬃciency.
All this must be qualiﬁed by noting that seeds, S , do not share some of the
features of inventions that are sometimes thought important. Namely,
1. Seeds are of purely private value, and not costlessly reproducible — as informa-
tion perhaps is — and cannot raise output in more than one ﬁrm;
182. The producer of a seed has a perfect property right to it even when markets for
seeds do not exist
If either assumption did not hold we would expect eﬃciency to fail.
5 Numerical solution and ﬁtting the data
Process for z.–We use the output-capital ratio for z. When de-trended linearly it
follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coeﬃcient 0.897, and innovation vari-
ance 0.026. The Tauchen-Hussey procedure for discretizing the AR yields a ﬁrst-order







Table 1 : T h eM a t r i xo ft r a n s i t i o np r o b a b i l i t i e sf o rz
which has the stationary distribution (0.307,0.386,0.307).
Parameters.–At this point we assume that k depreciates at the rate δ and S at
the rate γ so that their laws of motion (1) and (3) become k0 =( 1− δ)k + X and
Y 0 = λk+(1− γ)Y −X respectively. The details are in Appendix 2. The parameter
values
β σ δ γ λ ¯ z ρ std(z)
0.95 2.0 0.08 0.15 0.1080 0.1520 0.8970 0.0261
Table 2 : Parameter values
were chosen, among other reasons, so as to match (i) Ag r o w t ho fp e r - c a p i t ai n c o m e
of 1.4%, and (ii) An average level of Tobin’s Q of 1.22 and (iii) Some properties of
the Q and x series since WW2 which will be shown in Figure 5. Section 6.2 shows
that for a constant-z economy the growth rate is bounded by λ − δ,a n dt h a ti f
x<λ−δ, seeds accumulate indeﬁnitely and the seeds constraint becomes irrelevant.
The depreciation of S is γ and it was (rightly or wrongly) chosen based on estimates
of private obsolescence of knowledge by Griliches, Pakes, Schankerman and others.
Section 5 will brieﬂy deal with what happens when γ =0 .
195.1 Simulated decision rules and Q.
For the parameter values and transition probabilities stated in Tables 1 and 2, Figure
4 plots the equilibrium Q, the decision rules and the value function. In all the plots,
the variable on the horizontal axis is s, the beginning-of-period stock of seeds. We
may summarize the plots as follows:
1. Panel 1 of Figure 4 plots Tobin’s Q.A ss gets large, p(s,z) → 0 for all z,a n d
therefore Q(s,z) → 1.T h em a x i m a lQ of 1.75 occurs when s =0and z = z3.
2. The second panel plots investment, which responds more to s when z is high.
At z3 investment is constrained at low values of s.I np a r t i c u l a r ,x(s,z3)=λ+s
when s is close to zero, so that the initial slope of the red curve in Panel 2 is
unity. When z ∈ {z1,z 2},h o w e v e r ,x is never constrained and s then has a
much smaller eﬀect on it.
3. In Panel 3 we see the long-run distribution of seeds. Twenty-two percent of the
time s =0 , and seeds never reach 50 percent of k. Indeed, illustrated in Figure
5, the simulated s peaks at 0.32 in the late 80’s.
4. Finally, the last panel plots w which is negative (because σ exceeds unity) and
increasing in s. The increase with s is sharper for higher levels of z because
seeds are more valuable when z is high.
After s reaches 0.3, it makes very little diﬀerence to any of the variables.
5.2 Fitting the data
The state variables of the model are k,S, and z, and the decision variable is x.I n
addition, we focused on the price of seeds, p, but the real motivation for it is the role
that p plays in the price of the ﬁrm that, in its ex-dividend form, we label as Q.T h u s
we shall ﬁt the following post-war series: (i) The output-capital ratio, which in the
model is z, (ii) The seed-capital ratio, s, (iii) The investment-capital ratio, x,a n d
(iv) Tobin’s q as measured by P − z,w i t hP given by (22). In all four Panels the
blue lines represent the model and red lines represent the data.
The variables were constructed as follows:
1. The red line in Panel 1 of Figure 5 plots z = Y/k where Y = private non-farm
output and k = non-farm stock of capital. The model has just 3 values of z to
ﬁt this with — this quantity is exogenous in the model, being drawn from the
probability distributions implied by the transition matrix in (37).
2. Panel 2 plots the series for s implied by the model as the blue line. Panel 2 also
plots several possible proxies for s, each constructed via the formula
s
0 =
n +( 1− γ)s − x
1 − δ + x
, (38)












a) Tobin’s Q, Q(s|z)





















c) Empirical distribution of seeds, s
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d) Scaled value function, w(s|z)
Figure 4: Simulated value, decision rules, and Tobin’s Q for z1 <z 2 <z 3.
On the horizontal axis is s.
21where n is one of the following: (A) n =patents/(θk) (red line), (B) n =trademarks/(θk)
(green line), (C) n = λ (turquoise line). The constant θ ﬁxes units appropri-
ately; it is explained in Appendix 3.5 Red, green, and turquoise lines in the
second panel of Figure 5 correspond to cases A, B, and C. In cases A and B
the least-squares routine chose s0 =0as the initial condition. we noted that
the simulated s peaks at 0.32 in the late 80’s and grossly overpredicts the es-
timate of st that produces the model’s best ﬁtt ot h ep o s t - w a rd a t a—n o n eo f
the estimates of st ever rises above 0.2, i.e., above twenty percent of installed
capital.
3. Panel 3 shows that in its desire to ﬁt Q and the output-capital ratio, the model
generates too volatile an investment series, and z exerts a more important
inﬂuence on it than does s. From Panel 2 we see that the simulated s peaks at
0.32
4. In Panel 4 of Figure 5 we plot the actual and ﬁtted Q. For the measured Q,f o r
1951-1999 we use Hall’s series, but since it ends in 1999, for the period 1999-
2004 we use Abel’s data scaled so that the two Q series match in 1999. This is
the red line in Panel 4 of Figure 5. To get a sustained rise in Q we must have
a prolonged period during which z = z3. The ‘90s appear to have been such a
period. The simulation has z = z3 i np e r i o d s1 8 - 2 0 ,a n dP a n e l4s h o w st h a tQ
rises sharply during these periods as seeds get depleted, but Q then falls even
more sharply when z reverts to its mean value of z2 in period 21.
The parameters θ and s0 were chosen to minimize the RSS between the simulated
and constructed series. The model has a problem with reconciling the following facts:
• Y/k falls dramatically in the late 70’s and early 80’s, something that the model
interprets as a low-z epoch causing the huge buildup of seeds portrayed in panel
2 and the resulting collapse of Q to its lowest possible level of unity, and
• The rise in Q starting in the early 80s. Even with the accompanying rise in the
estimate of z from z1 to z2 in the mod 80s and then to z3 in 1991, it takes time
for s to be drawn to zero and for Q to rise to its maximal value of 1.75.
5The model is neutral in (λ,θ). Doubling these two parameters and doubling S0 doubles St for
all t but leaves all the other variables unchanged. Therefore θ has been normalized to unity up to
this point.






a) Simulated productivity shock






b) Simulated s'(s,z) series, s
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c) Simulated investment, x(s,z)



















Figure 5: Fitting the model to post-war data
235.3 Intangibles and Q, and other unconditional correlations











Table 3 : The Matrix of unconditional correlations in the model and
in the data
The signs the model produces are mostly correct, but the magnitudes are far apart
in some cases.
Intangibles and Q.–The correlation between s and Q is bolded in the two tables.
Ar i s ei ns represents a rise in the ratio of unimplemented intangible capital to tangible
capital. The stock of all intangible capital is k +S with k being the number of seeds







is also monotone in s. Herein lies the reason for why this model implies a fall in Q
whereas Hall’s (2000) implies a rise in Q. In my model, variation in intangibles is
caused by variation in the stock of unimplemented seeds. In Hall’s model there are
variable proportions between intangibles and physical capital in production and there
is no storage of intangibles, hence a rise in intangibles gives a rise in the productivity
of the ﬁrm’s measured capital and (barring GE eﬀects) a rise in the ﬁrm’s Q.
The model matches well the strong positive correlation between z and Q and
the negative correlation between s and x. That the latter should be negative in the
model may at ﬁrst seem to contradict Corollary 2 which says that the policy x(s,z) is
increasing in s, a fact that is also borne out by Panel 2 of Figure 4. It turns out that
the negative feedback eﬀect of x on s0 via () is stronger and renders the correlation
negative.
We already saw that the model generates too much volatility in investment. To
this it is driven by the attempt to also ﬁt Q. But the signs of the z − x correlations
are both positive in the two tables, even if their magnitudes diﬀer a lot. The glaring
discrepancy is the negative relation between s and z. Like the negative relation
between s and x, this one arises because s is constructed using (38), and again reﬂects
the negative eﬀect that x exerts on s0 through this accounting relation, and not any
negative eﬀect of s on x.
245.4 Simulations and data ﬁtting when γ =0
The depreciation of S is γ and it was set at 0.15. But one can make the case that
γ should be zero, since seeds represent knowledge and since in the model seeds are a
private good and cannot be used by anyone else. In any case, the model generates
more action for seeds in this case. When seeds last for ever, they exert a stronger
inﬂuence on the decision rules and equilibrium prices. For the parameter values and
transition probabilities stated in Tables 1 and 2 except that γ =0 , Figure 6 plots the
equilibrium Q, the decision rules and the value function. In all the plots, the variable
on the horizontal axis is s, the beginning-of-period seeds.
A comparison of Figures 4 and 6 shows, in their ﬁrst Panels, Q responding more
strongly to s; the maximal Q now is 2.6. Investment responds more strongly to s too,
as does w. In Panel 3 we see the long-run distribution of seeds moving more to the
right, so that s =0only seventeen percent of the time now as opposed to twenty-two
percent previously.
A comparison of Figures 5 and 7 shows, in Panel 1, a slightly higher z now. The
x series in Panel 3 is slightly less volatile. The main change is that now the model
gets more volatility in Q, but still cannot really ﬁt well the rise in Q starting in the
early 80s.
6 Comparison with the standard growth model
It may be of interest to compare things to what the standard model says. The stan-
dard model obtains when zmax <λor when s0 is “large”. I start with a comparison
using the simulations, and then move to the analytics which are relatively easy to
compare in the deterministic case
6.1 Simulations
If we simulate the model for a ﬁnite number of periods — 1000 in this case — there
exists a s0 so large that (4) will not bind, and so that the standard model roughly
obtains over the 10,000 periods. We therefore let s0 =5 0 ,000 and compare that
with the model when s0 =0 . We want, however, that the growth rate should be the
same in the two cases. When s0 i sl a r g ea n dw h e n( 4 )d o e sn o tn o tb i n d ,t h er a t e
of growth is E (x) − δ.W h e ns0 is low, and when (4) occasionally binds, investment
will on average be lower and so will growth, unless we change some parameters so as
to compensate. We lower z therefore by a constant when s0 is large so as to keep
average growth at 1.38 percent. Thus, for two separate initial conditions, s0 =0and
s0 = 50000, we take a 1000-long random sequence of the z’s and calculate the two
sets of moments in Table 4:












a) Tobin’s Q, Q(s|z)
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d) Scaled value function, w(s|z)






b) Empirical distribution of seeds, s
Figure 6: Decision rules and Q when γ =0 .






a) Simulated productivity shock






b) Simulated s'(s,z) series, s
0 = 0







c) Simulated investment, x(s,z)

















model 1 + p data
Figure 7: Fitting to data when γ =0











.Table 1 : Comparison to the standard growth model
On the region where (4) binds, consumption is more volatile than in the standard
model. The volatility of z is the same in the two cases. The case s0 =0is portrayed
in Figure 5. When we raise s0 to 50,000, the standard deviation of c, σ(c), falls by a
factor of 3.5, while the standard deviation of x rises by a factor of just 1.4.I no t h e r
words, the s0 =0version retains most of the volatility of investment implied by a
model with no adjustment costs. Note, moreover, that the removal of the constraint
comes at the cost of underpredicting Q. It would seem, then, that the current setup
is a desirable alternative to convex-adjustment-cost models that also ﬁt Q.I no r d e r
to ﬁta v e r a g eQ, they reduce the volatility of investment.
6.1.1 Deterministic case








Since k does not depreciate, x then equals the growth rate of k and of C. Let’s solve
for the constant-growth rate that would obtain in the absence of the constraint (4).
We shall call this the “desired” growth rate, xd.T h e nU0 (Ct+1)/U0 (Ct)=( 1+x)
−σ
and the eﬀective discount factor is
ˆ β ≡ β (1 + x)
−σ . (39)
An additional unit of capital produces z units for ever, and so optimal investment




1 − ˆ β
!
z =1 . (40)
Equations (39) and (40) can be solved for xd:
1+x
d =( β [1 + z])
1/σ . (41)
28The model collapses to the standard model if s goes oﬀ to inﬁnity. We seek
parameter restrictions that will prevent this from happening. From (4),
xt ≤ min(z,λ+ st) (42)
This, however, is a short-run constraint, that holds at each t.I fk were to grow faster
than λ, st would eventually become negative. To see this, combine (3) and (2) to get
S0 = S − X + λk and, hence,
st+1 =
λ + st − xt
1+xt
. (43)
It’s easy to show that λ is the maximal feasible long-run growth rate. Let ε be a
constant, and suppose that x = λ + ε.T h e n
Lemma 8 For all s0 ≥ 0,
(i) ε>0= ⇒ st →− ∞
(ii) ε<0= ⇒ st → +∞
Proof. (i) Let ε>0.T h e n st+1 = λ+st−x
1+x = st−ε
1+x <s t − ε






t →− ∞ . (ii) let ε<0.T h e nst+1 >s t+
|ε|
1+x so that st >s 0+
|ε|
1+xt → +∞.
Desired growth exceeds λ if
[β (1 + z)]
1/σ > 1+λ,
which is also when the seeds constraint binds in every period. High values of z or β,
and low values of σ and λ make it more likely that this inequality will hold. Tobin’s







1 − ˜ β
!






Values of Q above unity arise because consumption growth is lower than it would be
under xd; the rate of interest is thus lower, and this raises the present value of income
from capital above its cost.
The case σ =1 .–From (41), the desired investment and growth rate x is
x
d (z)=βz − (1 − β),
and Tobin’s Q is
Q(z)=
½
1 if xd (z) ≤ λ
β
1+λ−βz if xd (z) >λ .
The value of z at which xd (z)=λ is 1
β (1 + λ − β).F i g u r e8p l o t sxd (z) and Q(z).

























Figure 8: Comparative steady states for x and q when σ =1 .
Transitional dynamics in the deterministic case These are easier to analyze










zk = C + X,
the seed constraint reads
X ≤ S
and the laws of motion are
˙ S = λk − X
and
˙ k = k + X














so that eventually the seed constraint must bind, and so that eventually we know
that X = λk. But we want to see how fast this happens from initial conditions. We









In the limit, consumption will grow at the rate λ so that
U0(Cτ)









where the rate of interest is
ρ + σλ
which is less than z if (44) holds, so that Q∞ > 1. But if (44) does not hold, then
consumption grows at the rate
z−ρ
σ and Q∞ =1 .





+ µX + m(λk − X)+n(S − X)
(I think we can just add n(S − X) as I did at the end). The optimality conditions
are
X : − (zk − X)
−σ + µ − m − n =0
k : z (zk − X)
−σ + λm = −˙ µ + ρµ
S : n = − ˙ m + ρm
and the two constraints must hold.
The region [0,T) where X<S .–This is the initial stage, for a ﬁnite time, call it
[0,T]. In this region, n =0so that the last condition implies
mt = m0e
ρt for t<T
The ﬁrst condition implies, on this region,
(zk − X)
−σ = µ − m.






ρt = −˙ µ + ρµ
which is the diﬀerential equation
˙ µ =( ρ − z)µ +( z − λ)m0e
ρt
N o wa ne q u a t i o no ft h ef o r mdx









31The region [T,∞).–Here all the multipliers are constant. In particular
µ = Q∞ =1+m
These two conditions should help us determine T,e t c . .
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has emphasized extensive-margin investment. We found that when the
TFP shock is good, investment is likely to be constrained from above, so that con-
sumption rises more than it otherwise would. We also found that having a lot of unim-
plemented intangibles on hand lowers stock prices, just as a favorable “investment-
speciﬁc technological shock,” does, but that the model also has an intertemporal sub-
stitution components that is missing in other models that have such shocks. Finally,
we found that a stock market alone suﬃces to ensure eﬃciency of the equilibrium.
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338 Appendix
8.0.2 Proof of diﬀerentiability (Lemma 4)










λ + s + h − xs+h
1+xs+h
.
Variations.–We use (32) to ﬁgure out the feasible variations.
Variation (i).–If we begin at state s+h, and if we want to end up at s0










(1 + xs)(λ + s + h) − (λ + s − xs)
1+xs + λ + s − xs
=
(1 + xs)h + xs (λ + s)+xs
1+λ + s























w(s + h,z) ≥ U (z − ˆ x[s
0









= U (z − ˆ x[s
0







= U (z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) + Ah (w(s,z) − U (z − xs))
and
w(s + h,z) − w(s,z) > U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − AhU(cs)+( Ah − 1)w(s,z)
= U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − U(cs)+( Ah − 1)(w(s,z) − U(cs)).




















































Variation 2:S t a r tf r o ms and end at s0
s+h...
Variation (ii).– If we begin at state s, and if we want to end up at s0
















(1 + xs+h)(λ + s) − (λ + s + h − xs+h)
1+xs+h + λ + s + h − xs+h
=
xs+h(λ + s) − (h − xs+h)
1+λ + s + h
=
(1 + λ + s)xs+h − h
1+λ + s + h
=
(1 + λ + s + h)xs+h − h(1 + xs+h)
1+λ + s + h
= xs+h −
h(1 + xs+h)




1+λ + s + h
(47)











1+λ + s + h
¶1−σ
Therefore




















= U (z − ˆ x) − BhU (z − xs+h)+Bhw(s + h,z).
and therefore
w(s,z) − w(s + h,z) ≥ U (z − ˆ x) − BhU (z − xs+h)+( Bh − 1)w(s + h,z),
35i.e.,
w(s + h,z) − w(s,z) ≤ BhU (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x)+( 1− Bh)w(s + h,z) (48)
= U (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x)+( 1− Bh)[w(s + h,z) − U (cs+h)] (49)
Now, [w(s + h,z) − U (z − xs+h)] is Lipschitz in h for every z>0. This is because it
is bounded above by the increment in value when a unit of consumption is added in
perpetuity, and the latter is bounded as long as c>0, i.e., as long as z>0). Now,
by (47), xs+h ≥ ˆ x +
h(1+xs)
1+λ+s+h and therefore
U (z − xs+h) − U (z − ˆ x) ≤ U
µ
z − ˆ x +
h(1 + xs)
1+λ + s + h
¶
− U (z − ˆ x)
Using the RHS of this expression to replace the ﬁrst two terms on the RHS of 49)





(1 − Bh)[w(s + h,z) − U (cs+h)] =
1 − σ
1+λ + s
[w(s,z) − U (cs)]





0 (cs)(1+xs)+( 1− σ)[w(s,z) − U (cs)]) (50)




([1 − σ]w − (1 + z)U
0 (c)) > 0.
For them to be the same we would need that
−(1 + x)U




0 − (1 − σ)U = −(1 + z)U
0,
i.e.
(1 − σ)U =( z − x)U
0
w h i c hi st r u eb e c a u s ez−x = c so that both sides of the equation equal c1−σ. Therefore
(57) and (50) imply (8).
8.0.3 Depreciation
Let δ = depreciation of k and let γ be the depreciation of S. The laws of motion and
the value are
k
0 = k(1 − δ)+X,( 5 1 )
36S
0 = S (1 − γ)+λk − X,( 5 2 )
and




















s(1 − γ)+λ − x





λ + s(1 − γ) − x
1 − δ + x
, (54)
so that (1 − δ + x)s0 = λ + s(1 − γ) − x. Collecting terms, we get
xs
0 + x = λ + s(1 − γ) − (1 − δ)s
0,
w h i c hl e a v e su sw i t h
ˆ x(s
0,s)=
λ + s(1 − γ) − (1 − δ)s0
1+s0 . (55)












λ + s(1 − γ) − x








and we still have P =
vk+svs
C−σ .
diﬀerentiability, i.e., ws, when there is depreciation I use subscripts to denote




λ + s(1 − γ) − xs




λ +( s + h)(1− γ) − xs+h
1 − δ + xs+h
.
37If we begin at state s + h, and to end up at s0

















(1 − δ + xs)(λ +( s + h)(1− γ)) − (1 − δ)(λ + s(1 − γ) − xs)
1 − δ + xs + λ + s(1 − γ) − xs
=
(1 − δ + xs)(λ + s(1 − γ)+h(1 − γ)) − (1 − δ)(λ + s(1 − γ) − xs)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
=
(1 − δ)(λ + s(1 − γ)+h(1 − γ)) + xs (λ + s(1 − γ)+h(1 − γ)) − (1 − δ)(λ + s(1 −
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
=
(1 − δ)h(1 − γ)+xs (λ + s(1 − γ)+h(1 − γ)) + (1 − δ)xs
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
=
(1 − δ)h(1 − γ)+xs [1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)+h(1 − γ)]
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
= xs +
(1 − δ)h(1 − γ)+xsh(1 − γ)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
= xs + h
(1 − γ)(1− δ + xs)





1 − δ +ˆ x


















ˆ x − xs = h
(1 − γ)(1− δ + xs)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
.
Therefore
w(s + h,z) ≥ U (z − ˆ x[s
0









= U (z − ˆ x[s
0







= U (z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) + Ah (w(s,z) − U (z − xs))
and
w(s + h,z) − w(s,z) > U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − AhU(cs)+( Ah − 1)w(s,z)
= U(z − ˆ x[s
0
s,s+ h]) − U(cs)+( Ah − 1)(w(s,z) − U(cs)).















(1 − γ)(1− δ + xs)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
+
(1 − σ)(1− γ)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
[w(s,z) − U(cs)]
(57)


































(1 − γ)(1− δ + x)
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
([1 − σ]w − (1 − δ + xs)U
0 − (1 − σ)U)
=
1 − γ
1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
¡
[1 − σ]w − (1 − δ + x)(z − x)




1 − δ + λ + s(1 − γ)
¡
[1 − σ]w − (z − x)
−σ [1 − δ + z]
¢
,
which one also could obtain by assuming diﬀerentiability in (56) and applying the
envelope theorem. The expression collapses to (8) when γ = δ =0 .
8.0.4 Construction of ˆ St
Two practical problems face us when constructing a proxy for S. First, (3) will
sometimes lead S to be negative. That is, if we use (??)a sap r o x yf o rλk,t h e
resulting S will become negative. To prevent this from happening, we change (3) to
S
0 =m a x( 0 ,λk+ S − X). (58)
Second, we face a units-conversion problem. What we measure, though, is not S
but its proxy, ˆ S, which we shall assume obeys the equation
ˆ S = θS = θλk ≡ NEW PATENTS & TRADEMARKS,
39Since S is measured in consumption units, θ is the number of ˆ S units per unit of con-
sumption. (Our measures of X and k are already in consumption units). Substituting











, i.e., ˆ S
0 =m a x
³





k0 (1 − δ + x)=m a x( 0 ,θλ+ˆ s − θx),
where ˆ s =
ˆ S
k. Therefore the law of motion for ˆ s is
ˆ s
0 =
max(0,θλ+ˆ s − θx)







0, NEW PATENTS &TRADEMARKS
CAPITAL STOCK +ˆ s − θx
¢
1 − δ + x
,





0, NEW PATENTS &TRADEMARKS
θCAPITAL STOCK + s − x
¢
1 − δ + x
.
40